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Over the last few decades, the US executive branch has been a central 
player in numerous struggles over the content of global pacem law. 
Although the venue for these struggles has frequently shifted, the 
executive branch has consistently favored strong patent rights. In this 
chapter, I discuss how US global positioning compares co positions 
taken by executive branch agencies that focus on domestic policy. 
I also discuss how rhe rise of China may affect not only US global 
and domestic patent policy bur also larger questions of "innovation 
policy." 
I. A Brief History of US Efforts 
Starting in the 1980s, the US and like-minded countries engineered a 
transfer of patent law discussions from the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO) co a venue, the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), chat they viewed as more friendly to strong patent rights. 
At che WTO, these countries succeeded in promulgating a suite of 
minimum intellectual property standards in rhe 1994 Agreement 
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS 
Agreement).' 
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Subsequently, when Geneva-based institutions not only proved resis-
tant tO further increases in global patent protection,2 but actually emerged as 
fora for pushing back on the TRIPS Agreemenc,3 the United Stares shifted its 
efforts ro bilateral and plurilaceral agreements. The United States currently has 
"TRIPS-plus" intellectual property provisions in bilateral treaties negotiated 
with numerous developing countries, including Bahrain, Cambodia, Chile, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Jordan, Nicaragua, Oman, Panama, Peru, and Viernam.4 
On rhe plurilareral parent from , the United States has also been active, 
if less immediately successfuL Although some scholars had argued that the 
Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) could inhibit access to generic 
drugs by encouraging parries to adopt border measures tO interdict drugs sus-
peered of patent or trademark infringement,5 the treaty's border measures ulti-
mately excluded patents.6 Activicy now centers on the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
Agreement (TPP), a p lurilareral agreement being negotiated among the United 
States, Australia, New Zealand, Chile, Brunei, Singapore, Peru, Vietnam, 
Malaysia, and (most recently) Japan. 
The patent provisions of these bilateral and plurilateral agreements focus on 
pharmaceuticals? The provisions of the draft TPP agreement appear representa-
tive. Although an official draft of the TPP has not been made public,leaked drafts 
include a host of requirements related ro pharmaceuricals.8 Perhaps the most signif-
icant is a requirement that signatOries allow so-called "secondary" patents. These are 
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patents that cover not the drug's primary active chemical compound bur, instead, 
modified forms of the compound (e.g., salts, isomers), new uses of the compow1d, 
or new methods of using the compound.9 According to one leaked draft, the TPP's 
secondary patent provision states that patents on new forms, uses, and methods 
"may satisfy the criteria for patentability, even if such invention does not result in the 
enhancement of the known efficacy of that product."10 This provision appears tO be 
a direct response to Article 3( d) of the Indian Patent Act, which prohibits granting 
patents on "the mere discovery of a new form of a known substance which does not 
result in the enhancement of the known efficacy of that substance ... . "11 
Other significant TPP provisions include a mandate of data exclusivity to the 
originator fum d1at supplies the clinical data for the national regulatory authority's 
approval of a drug. The draft agreement calls for five years of exclusivity from the 
date of marketing approval of a new "pharmaceutical product"12 and three years 
from the date of marketing approval based on new "clinical information."13 The 
TPP draft also calls for legal linkage between patents and approval by a regulatory 
authority of generic marketing. Specifically, prior to securing approval, the generic 
firm must show mat patents relevant to the drug have expired, are invalid, or are 
not infringed.14 This legal linkage has the potential to delay generic marketing, as 
does a TPP provision calling for patent term extension based on regularory delays.15 
Finally, TPP signatories are supposed to agree to limits on pre-grant opposition pro-
ceedings and ro border measure provisions to interdict goods suspected of patent 
infringement, including in-transit goods. 16 
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II. Comparing International and Domestic Positions 
To a significant extent, the pharmaceutical patent positions being advocated by the 
United States internationally overlap with current US law. As discussed further 
below, US law allows at least certain types of secondary patents. United States' law 
also confers five- and three-year data exclusivity terms for originator applications, 
establishes a linkage between parenting and approval of generics by the Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA), contains patent term extensions for delays in both 
patent processing at the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) and regula-
tory approval delays at the FDA, and prohibits pre-gram opposition. 
The extent co which the US-style approach to pharmaceutical patents is 
appropriate for poorer countries is the subject of tremendous dispute. Presumably, 
however, US executive branch advocacy for parent righ:s abroad stronger than 
those for which it advocates domestically would be even more controversial. 
Thus it is worth examining whether the US international posture is in fact more 
"pro-patent" than its domestic posture. 
One candidate for such inconsistency is the US non-obviousness require-
ment. As compared with its application in others areas of technology, judicial 
application of the non-obviousness requirement in pharmaceuticals has been 
relatively robuscP Notably, the executive branch has consistently supported 
a strong non-obviousness requirement. In fact, in 2007, the executive branch 
was influential in persuading rhe US Supreme Court co issue an opinion, KSR 
v. Teiejlex, 18 making it dear co lower courts chat non-obviousness was an impor-
tant gatekeeper requirement for all patent applications.19 
The executive branch's domestic support for non-obviousness as a muscular 
requirement is arguably in tension with its international position chat secondary 
pacencs on new formulations "may satisfy the criteria for patentability, even if 
such invention does nor result in the enhancement of the known efficacy of that 
producr."20 Although US non-obviousness law does not deny secondary formula-
tion patents, it typically subjects them co a requirement that the formulation have 
unexpected propenies.21 Moreover, during the Obama administration, the exec-
utive branch brought a Supreme Court case arguing that US antitrust law, US 
patent law, and the US "Hacch-Waxman" regime for patent linkage and generic 
17. Arri Rai, Building a Better Innovation Symm: Combining Facially NmtraiPatent Standards 
with Regulation ~(End Product Therapewics, 45 Hous. L. REv. 1037 (2008). 
18. sso u.s. 398 (2007}. 
19. Arri Rai, Wbo's Afaid oftbe Federal Circuit.?, 121 YALE L.J. ONL. 135 (2011}. 
20. TPP1,mpra nore 8, an. 8. 
21. Rai,>7tpm nore 17. 
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entry are all intended tO encourage validity challenges by generics to secondary 
pharmaceutical parents that might be non-obvious or otherwise invalid.22 Over 
rhe strong objections of che branded pharmaceutical industry, the Obama admin-
istration also successfully argued in favor of allowing generic entry in cases where 
che generic states it will not market irs produce for uses indicated in secondary 
method-of-use patents.23 
Ultimately, in part because of executive branch advocacy of robust generic 
entry through Hatch-Waxman, che actual time to generic entry has remained 
stable over the past decade despite increases in secondary patenring.24 In con-
trast, no suggestion that signatOries are permitted co constrain secondary patent-
ing through robust generic challenge appears in the language of the leaked TPP 
drafts. Thus, chere is arguably some tension in the US executive branch's domestic 
and international positions. 
A realist who assumes chat stares pursue only cheir immediate material inter-
est (with more or .less success depending on their military and economic clout)25 
would presumably find lit de reason for congruence between domestic and inter-
national positions. Even so, delving into the institutional dynamics rhac lead ro 
divergent domestic and imernational positions highlights the agendas, and rela-
tive power, of different agencies. 
Consider first the domestic context. A.lthough certain agencies and White 
House offices may be quire supportive of strong domestic pacem righcs, they 
compete for influence on questions of domestic patent policy with agencies typi-
cally more wary of parent rights. TI1e latter group includes che Antitrust Division 
of the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), and 
the Department of Health and Hw11an Services (HHS).26 On the specific ques-
tion of pharmaceutical pacem policy, DOJ Antitrust, FTC, and HHS have all 
committed themselves quite publicly to facilitating domestic generic entry so as 
co achieve low-cosc access for US parients.l'· A.lrhough the commitment of the 
22. Brief for the Petitioner, FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013) (No. 12-416), avail-
able at http:/ /www.justicc.gov/atr/cascs/f29l700/29l720.pdf. 
23. Arri Rai, Use Patent.>; Carve-Outs, and Incentives-A New Battle in the Drug Patent U1zrs, 
367 N. ENGL.]. MF.D. 491 (2012). 
24. Scott C. HemphiU & Bhaven N. Sampat, Evergreming, Patent Cballenges, tmd ~ffective 
lvfarketLifdnPbarmaceuticals, 31]. HEALTH EcoN. 327 (2012). 
25. Anne-Marie Slaughrer, InternationaL Relations, Principal 1heorie . .-, in MAX PLANCK 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (R. Wolfrum ed.. 20 I) ). 
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DO] Antitrust and the FTC is largely ideological, agencies such as HH$, as well 
as powerful White House offices such as the Office of Management and Budget, 
have a direct budgetary interest in costs incurred by public insurance programs. 
By contrast, although an executive branch constituency for low-cost global 
access does exist, irs strength is limited. Domestically oriented agencies obviously 
do not have a strong financial stake in global access. To rhe extent they support 
such a goal in principle, they are likely to manifest such support through laudable 
but modest programs chat emphasize voluntary incentives for patent holders. 
During the first Oban1a administration, for example, the USPTO established a 
progran1 under which entities that demonstrate successful deployment of tech· 
nology for humanitarian use can receive accelerated patent processing.28 
International humanitarian programs, such as the President's Emergency 
Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), which provides antiretroviral (ARV) drugs 
to 5.1 million of the 8 million individuals currently receiving ARVs in low· and 
middle-income countries, do have a direct financial stake in low-cost global 
access. Congress scrutinizes the activities of PEP FAR (and the Deparm1ent of 
State office chat manages PEPFAR) to determine whether it is procuring ARV 
drugs at a low per-patient cosr.29 To fulfill this goal, PEPFAR relies heavily on 
generic drug producers such as India. Indeed, according to a recent Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) report, from 2005 to 2011, PEPFAR's reliance on 
generic ARVs increased from 15 percent by volume to 98 percenr.30 This increase 
saved PEPFAR approximately $934 million, allowing the program to expand 
coverage rapidly and to include World Health Organization-recommended 
products, such as fixed-dose combination products that do not have an equiva· 
lem branded formulationY 
Particularly in times of national economic stress, however, the power of these 
constituencies is not comparable to that of economically oriented offices such as 
the Office of rhe United States Trade Representative (USTR). Although USTR 
is a small office with a budget of less than $100 million, its career staff is highly 
skilled, it is committed to strong global IP rights, and it has dose connections 
28. Quentin Palfrey & Hillary Chen. Rei/Jarding Inventors Wbo Work to Solve Global 
Challenges, WHITEHOuSE.Gov (Feb. 8, 2012 10:22 AM), http://www.whitchouse.gov/ 
blog/20 12/02/08/ rewarding·inventors·who·work·solvc·globaJ.challengcs (discussing rhe 
launch of the Patents for Humanity program). 
29. U.$. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GA0-13·345, P RESIDENT'S EMERGENCY 
PLAN FOR AIDS RELIEF (20 13), av,zilable at hrcp:/ /www.gao.gov/producrs/ GAO·l3·345. 
30./d. 
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with US corporate leadership. The USTR rhus exercises significant influence 
across changes in political leadership. 
From a realist perspective, the ability of other countries to chaUenge the 
United States is also limited. Although certain large emerging economies such 
as India might invoke the manner in which US domestic law diverges from T PP 
as rhetorical support for their own efforts to develop alternatives to TPP-type 
regimes,32 mere compelling rhecoric is unlikely to diminish US influence, partic-
ularly in the bilateral and plurilateral context. 
Even perspectives that emphasize the role of multilateral institutions in 
mediating longer-term, iterated baxgaining berween states might deem the US 
approach a relatively stable equilibrium. On chis view, deviations between the 
positions the United States is advocating internationally and domestically are 
sufficiently narrow that they may fail to impress even international institutions 
that have a "pro-access" agenda. Moreover, from the standpoint of delivering a 
clear public message, both these institutions and civil society groups may prefer 
to emphasize not narrow technical differences between US global and domestic 
approaches but instead what they see as direct links between the strong patenting 
and lack of access. 
Going forward, rhe situation may change if the US healthcare spending 
dilemma becomes sufficiently untenable that more dramatic moves are made with 
respect to biopharmaceutical patents. But for the moment the United States is 
likely co be able co manage any tensions in its global and domestic positions. 
I turn next co the potentially disruptive role of China. Because China's devel-
opment strategy has generally been ''pro-patent;' and because it has specifically 
refrained from playing a leadership role in global controversies over access to 
medicines, China's rise probably will not disrupt the equilibrium that the United 
States has achieved on biopharmaceutical patents. Nonetheless, as discussed 
below, China is likely to play a role in numerous domestic deliberations outside 
the biopharmaceurical arena. On the global stage, China's relationship to the 
American-led TPP negotiations will be an issue worth watching. 
Ill. The Rise of China 
For several reasons, China's rise is qualitatively different from what has come 
before, at least since the rise of the Japanese economy in the 1970s and 1980s. 
Most obviously, unlike other nations, China represents a serious threat to 
US global economic dominance. Additionally, in conrrast to large emerging 
32. Amy Kapczynski, H,zrmonization ,md Its Discontem~·: A Case Stud_y of TRIPS 
Implemem,uion in Jnditl's Pbar-t~ltlCettric,zl Sector, 97 CAL. L. REv. 1571 (2009). 
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economies such as India and Brazil. which have generally favored weaker pat-
em protection, China has become substantially more aggressive than the United 
States in encouraging its firms to seek parents. 
That said, the Chinese approach coward patents has not been unilaterally 
"pro-patent." To the contrary, in the context of standard setring and patents, 
China has sometimes taken positions char could be seen as "anti-patent," perhaps 
on the theory that standard setting represents a context where aggressive patent 
assertions have che potential co create particularly acute "holdup" problems for 
follow-on innovation.33 Relacedly, China appears to view patents as an integral 
piece of a broader innovation policy. Indeed, since 2006, China has been imple-
menting a sweeping "innovation strategy" in which patents represent one lever. 
By contrast, the US executive branch has historically resisted discussions of inno-
vation policy, lese such discussions be seen as veering coo close roan endorsement 
of industrial policy. 
H ow the unique case of China's patent and innovation policy affects US posi-
tions domestically and internationally is a story that is only beginning to unfold. 
After discussing China's patent and innovation policy, I offer some preliminary 
choughcs. 
IV. China's Patent and Innovation Policy 
In 2011 , the Chinese State lntelleccual Property Office (SIPO) promulgated a 
National Patent Development Strategy in which it set forth a goal of two mil-
lion patent applications by 2015. Byway of comparison, the USPTO had 25 per-
cent of that figure (540,000 applications) in 2012. To be sure, the two million 
figure misses important distinctions between invention patents chat have been 
examined for inventiveness and appropriate scope by an administrative agency 
(so-called invention patents) and uti lity models available without examination. 
TI1e figure also fails to distinguish between domestic invention parents and inven-
tion patents filed by firms based in other countries. 
However, even if we focus only on domestic invention patents, China's trajec-
tory is notable. Since 2000, most of the growth in China's domestic patent appli-
cations has come from domestic invention patents.34 As a consequence, although 
foreign and domestic inventors filed approximately similar numbers of invention 
patents until 2005, by 2008 the domestic inventor percentage of applications 
33. Mark Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patmt Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEx. L. REv. 1991 
(2007). 
34. Alben Hu & Gary Jefferson, A Gr~at Wall ofPatents: Wbat Is Bebind Cbina's Rtcent Patmt 
ExplosJoll?, 90 J. DEv. EcoN. 57 (2009). 
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.filed had increased tO 67.1 percent. Additionally, by 2008, che absolute number of 
domestic invention patent grants was equal w foreign invention patent grants. By 
2011, SIPO was ahead of the VSPTO with respect ro domestic invention patent 
applications filings and grants in che respective offices. SIPO had 415,829 domes-
tic invention patent applications, as compared with 247,750 for the USPTO, and 
112,347 domestic invention grants, as compared with 108,626 for the USPT0.35 
Another traditional proxy for patents chat are likely tO have commercial value 
is patents filed at WIPO via the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT). China's num-
bers here are also rising rapidly. In 2011, China occupied the fourth spot, behind 
che United States, Japan, and Germany.36 
In part, these increasing numbers reflect a deliberate strategy by the Chinese 
government to encourage patenting. According ro the US International Trade 
Commission (USITC), provincial governments offer payments tO Chinese com-
panies tO support the filing of patents in China and overseas.37 Chinese compa-
nies may also qualify for tax relief, research awards, and government conn·acts 
through patenting.38 In some cases, China is giving specific funds tO small and 
medium-sized firms that file abroad. For exan1ple, in October 2009, the Chinese 
Ministry of Finance announced a 100 million RMB fund to help small and 
medium enterprises (SMEs), as well as public research insticmions, file abroad.39 
That said, the firms most responsible for high levels of Chinese patenting 
both domestically and abroad are large information and communications tech-
nology (ICT) firms.40 Indeed, in 2011, two Chinese telecommunications firms, 
ZTE Corp. and Huawei Technologies, had the largest and third-largest number 
of PCT applications respectively. For these firms, the Chinese government may 
be interested nor so much in innovation per seas in the need to assemble defen-
sive patent portfolios in order to compete in the global ICT marketplace. 
35. Peter Yu, Five Oft-Reptated Questions About China's Recem Rise as a Patent Power·, 2013 
CARDOZO L. REv. DE Novo 78 (2013). 
36. WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. 0RC. (WIPO), WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
INDICATORS 63 (2012), available at hrrp:/ /www.wipo.inr/exporr/sites/www/freepublica-
rions/ cn/intproperty/941/wipo_pub _941_20 12.pdf. 
37. U.S. lNT'L TRADE COMM'N (USITC), Pub. No. 4199, China: IP lnfringemenr, Indigenous 
Innovarion Policies and Framework for Measuring the Effects on the U.S. Economy (20 10), 
available at hnp:/ /www.usitc.gov/publicarions/332/pub4199.pdf. 
38./d. 
39. Tu Lei, Ministry ofFinance to Support Overseas Patent:;, ALIBAllA.COM (Ocr. 13, 2009, 8:02 
AM), hrtp:// news.alibaba.com/ arricle/demil/business-in-china/1 00 182805-1-mof-support-
overscas-patenrs.html. 
40. Markus Eberhardt, Christian Helmers & Zhihong Yu, lr the Dmgon Leaming to F~y!' .-in 
Analysis of the Chinese Patmt Explosion, (Univ. of Oxford Crr. for rhe Srudy of African Econs. 
Working Paper Series, No. 2011-15, 20 l 1). 
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The Chinese government has not, however, been uniformly "pro-patent." 
To the contrary, in 2009, the government proposed regulations that would have 
required patented technology relevant to national standards to be subject to 
compulsory licensing either royalty-free or at below-market rates.41 Although 
the government then acceded tO commentary by foreign firms strongly opposing 
these proposed regulations, it still manages standard setting centrally.42 
China's patent strategy is just one part of an overall fifteen-year innovation 
strategy. The strategy, summarized in a 2006 document entitled the "National 
Medium and Long Term Plan for Science and Technology Development," not 
only specifies domestic invention patent goals (further refined in the 2011 
patent plan noted earlier) but more broadly calls for China to become an 
"innovation-oriented society" by 2020.43 The approach suggested by the plan 
includes: an emphasis on "zuzhu chuangxin"-a somewhat ambiguous concept 
often translated as "indigenous innovarion;'44 prioritizing certain areas offwncier 
technology, the development of an "integrated national system of institutions 
supportive of R&D", increased funding for R&D, and assimilation of foreign 
technology. 
V. The US Reaction 
Thus far, the US executive branch has reacted most strongly, at least at the rhe-
torical level, to the Chinese "indigenous innovation" strategy. It has particularly 
objected to the government procurement preferences for Chinese firms, which 
form part of the strategy. These objections may form part of the basis for US 
resistance to Chinese participation in the TPP negotiations. 
The executive branch's reaction to the notable growth in Chinese patent appli-
cations and patents has emphasized quality problems, particularly in utility appli-
cations that are not examined. For example, even the White House Office of the 
lmeUecrual Property Enforcement Coordinator, which traditionally advocates 
for strong intellectual property protection internationally, has publicly expressed 
concern about the quality of "unexamined utility model patencs."45 Presumably 
41. USITC, supra note 37. 
42. !d. U.S. 11n'L TRADE CoMM'N (USITC), China: Etfccrs of IP Infringcmcnr and 
Indigenous Innovation Policies on rhc U.S. Economy (2011) available at http:/ / www.usirc. 
gov I publicarions/332/ pub4226.pdf. 
43. Cong Cao, Richard P. Surtmcier & Denis F. Simon, China's 15-Ytar Science and Technology 
Plan, S9 PHYSICS TODAY 38-43 (2006). 
44. Yu, supra note 3S. 
4S. Mark MacCarthy. Cbina's Utility Modtl Systtm: A Ptrftct Storm for Pattnl Trolls, DIGITAL 
DISCOURSE (Sept. 20,20 12), http:/ /www.siia.ner/bloglindex.php/20 12/09/chinas-uriliry-m 
odcl-patent-sysrcm•a·perfect-srorm-for-patent-rrolls (last visited Sepr. S, 2013 ). 
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these concerns are also being expressed in private bilateral meetings, and will 
become more acute as China's patent litigation docket continues co increase sig-
nificantly and we see more cases of Chinese firms using patents arguably of dubi-
ous quality ro sue US firms. 
Agreemenc across the executive branch about poor Chinese patent quality 
could bolster efforts to improve patent quality domestically. Alcernacively, the 
executive branch might feel compelled to compere with China on patent appli-
cations and grants. The domestic effect in the United States of Chinese efforts 
in the areas of standard setting and innovation policy could also be significant. 
In standard setting, the executive branch has, since 1998, had a formal policy of 
deferring to private sector efforts. Specifically, Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB) Circular A-119, entitled "Federal Participation in the Development 
and Use of Voluntary Consensus Standards and in Conformity Assessment 
Activities:· directs agencies char need to adopt standards generally ro defer to 
decisions made by private sector standard-setting bodies.46 This deferential policy 
has, however, been criticized for being outdated, particularly in light of increasing 
concerns about holdup when private standard-setting bodies have unclear poli-
cies on patents. Even so, the executive branch has not an1ended Circular A-119. 
A recent statement by OMB, USTR, and the White House Office of Science 
and Technology Policy (OSTP) does indicate that, in certain areas of"national 
priority:' such as health information technology and promoting clean energy, 
federal agencies might be more proactive with respect to standards.47 Overall, 
however, the document reaffirms a commitmem co private-seccor leadership in 
the area. A desire on the part of certain executive branch offices (and like-minded 
congressional leaders) to present a strong counter-exan1ple co China may con-
strain domestic action on standards. Similarly, rhe need to draw a stark contrast 
with China may represent at least a rhetorical obstacle co the adoption of highly 
proactive executive branch innovation policies. 
Ultimately, concerns about drawing contrasts with China are probably less 
important than purely domestic factors such as pro-market ideology, political 
gridlock, or dran1atic fiscal constraints. Even so, of any country that could affect 
US patent and innovation policy in the domestic context, China is the likeliest 
candidate. 
46. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDG ET, ExEC. O FFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OMB CIRCULAR 
No. A-119, fEDERAL PARTICIPATION IN T HE DEVEI.OP.MENT AN D USE O F VOLUNTARY 
CONSENSUS STANDARDS AND IN CONI'ORMIT Y ASSESS~!ENT ACTIVITIES, 63 Fed. Reg. 
8546 (Feb. 19, 1998), available 11t hrrp: / / www.whirehousc.gov/omb/ckculars_all9 _all9fr. 
47. MF.MORAND U.M FROM T H E O FFlC£ OF M GMT. & BuDGET, U.S. TRADE REP. & 0HIC F. 
Of SciENCE & TECH. PoL'Y (Jan.17, 2012), at1ailable at hrrp: //www.whirchouse.gov/ sires/ 
defaulr/ files/ omb/memoranda/20 12/ m-12-0S.pdf. 
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On the global patent stage, one key question tO watch will be China's relation-
ship to the TPP negotiations. With respect to the possibility of Chinese entry, 
US executive branch views will be influenced in part by wariness regarding rhe 
impact of Chinese patent and innovation policy on the interests of US firms. By 
the same token, any aggressive move by the United States to exclude China may 
have unintended consequences in terms of causing China tO more aggressively 
pursue patent and innovation strategies that explicidy favor Chinese firms. 
